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INCREASING CASE TRAFFIC:
EXPANDING THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT’S FOCUS ON
HUMAN TRAFFICKING CASES
Nadia Alhadi*

I. Introduction
Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (the
1
“ICC” or “the Court”) includes human trafficking —both labor and sex traf2
ficking—as an actus reus constituting a crime against humanity. A wide3
spread, pervasive crime afflicting millions around the globe, trafficking
generally consists of “[t]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring
or receipt of persons” through force or coercion “for the purpose of exploi4
tation.” Trafficking is neither confined to a specific geographic area, nor to

*
J.D., December 2018, University of Michigan Law School; Judicial Fellow, International Court of Justice. All views and mistakes are my own. I owe a huge thank you to the
editors of the Michigan Journal of International Law, especially to Chris Opila and Annemarie Smith-Morris, for their thoughtful suggestions which helped me work through some serious knots in earlier versions of this note. Thank you to Professor Sonja Starr and her International Criminal Law seminar, which first gave me the opportunity to really think through this
topic and provided initial feedback. I am also grateful to the University of Michigan Human
Trafficking Clinic—where my interest in studying human trafficking began—and especially
to Professor Elizabeth Campbell, a wonderful instructor, mentor, friend, and a tremendous
resource for helping me reflect on prosecutable cases. Thank you to Sam for reading multiple
iterations of this piece, endlessly supporting my endeavors, and keeping me laughing all along
the way. And most of all, thank you to my parents, Taufiek and Theresa, who are real life superhumans, and to my brother, John. They made sure I made it to and through law school, and
they have always encouraged me to go where my dreams take me, no matter how many miles
or oceans away that may be.
1.
Hereinafter the general term “trafficking” refers to human trafficking.
2.
See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of how article 7’s provisions on slavery capture
human trafficking.
3.
Human Trafficking by the Numbers, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Jan. 7, 2017),
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/human-trafficking-numbers; Global Estimates of
Modern Slavery: Forced Labour and Forced Marriage, INTERNATIONAL LABOR
ORGANIZATION, at 9 (2017), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/--dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_575479.pdf [hereinafter Global Estimates of Modern
Slavery].
4.
G.A. Res. 55/25, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the U.N. Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime art. 3(a), Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319 [hereinafter Trafficking Protocol] (providing a widely-accepted definition for human trafficking). See infra Part III (review-
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a particular social, political, or cultural climate. Nor does it only take one
form: It can fester within one country’s borders, or transcend state boundaries; it can crop up as a side effect of conflict, or occur during moments of
5
peace; and it can be perpetrated through complex statewide or cross-border
networks or confined to micro-level interactions between an individual traf6
ficker and a single victim.
Given the internationality of many trafficking schemes, one might expect that trafficking cases would tend to come before the ICC. The Court,
7
however, has never heard a trafficking case. Neither has any other interna8
tional criminal tribunal (“ICT”), though some have heard related cases,
9
10
such as those relating to forced labor in camps and to forced prostitution.
ing the aims of the Trafficking Protocol and the obligations it places on States Parties). The
full text of the article 3(a) reads:
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall
include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms
of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs[.]
5.
See infra Part II (providing an overview on the forms and causes of human trafficking).
6.
Id.
7.
Idil Atak & James C. Simeon, Human Trafficking: Mapping the Legal Boundaries
of International Refugee Law and Criminal Justice, 12 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1019, 1036
(2014); see also Cóman Kenny & Nikita Malik, Trafficking Terror and Sexual Violence: Accountability for Human Trafficking and Sexual Gender-Based Violence by Terrorist Groups
Under the Rome Statute, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 43, 55 (2019). Notably, in a 2018 annual report to the United Nations Security Council, ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda expressed
that her office has begun focusing more on human trafficking, with a particular interest in investigating trafficking crimes in Libya. Office of the Prosecutor, Statement to the UN Security
Council on the Situation in Libya, Pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), ¶ 38 (May 9, 2018),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180509-otp-stat-UNSC-lib. That being said,
the Court has yet to have any trials for trafficking crimes.
8.
Kenny & Malik, supra note 7, at 55. Examples of other tribunals include the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Extraordinary Chambers for the
Courts of Cambodia, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the International Military Tribunal
for Germany (the “Nuremburg Tribunal”) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East (responsible for the “Tokyo Trials”).
9.
See, e.g., Slave Labor—Count Three, United States v. Krupp Von Bohlen und Halbach et al., Military Tribunal III, 9 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg
[Nuremburg] Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, ch. VIII, ¶¶ 46–63
(1950), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-IX.pdf (discussing Krupp’s role in forcing over 100,000 people into labor); Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No.
IT-97-25, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 189–207 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar.
15, 2002) (reviewing the trial court’s acquittal of the accused for enslavement and slavery of
forced laborers and reversing the trial court’s acquittal of the accused for persecution in the
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That being said, the ICC, in conjunction with other international prevention
11
mechanisms, has the potential to provide a macro-level response to this
crime, especially to trafficking schemes entangled with states or state-like
powers.
This note tackles two main questions. First, has either the unusual way
trafficking is codified in the Rome Statute or ICT case law prevented the
Court from prosecuting trafficking as a crime against humanity? Second, if
the ICC were to develop an interest in introducing the first trafficking cases
in international criminal law (“ICL”), what should such cases look like?
Should they be confined only to cases of trafficking in armed conflict, or
might they also cover certain kinds of systemic trafficking occurring in
times of relative peace?
12
The current scholarship falls short in addressing these questions. In an
effort to fill this gap, this note examines whether and how the ICC could
form of forced labor for the same behavior); Prosecutor v. Brima et al., SCSL-2004-16-A,
Further Amended Consolidated Indictment, ¶ 66 (Special Court for Sierra Leone Feb. 18,
2005) (indicting the accused for forced labor as a crime against humanity); Prosecutor v.
Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/14, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 23 (Mar. 23, 2016), ¶
157 (same, for forced labor as enslavement, a crime against humanity).
10.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23, Appeal Judgment (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002) (charging the accused with enslavement
as a crime against humanity); Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision on the Confirmation of the Charges, ¶¶ 53–57, 74 (June 9, 2014), (confirming that there are grounds to
prosecute the accused for sexual slavery as a crime against humanity); Prosecutor v. Brima et
al., Further Amended Consolidated Indictment, at 14 (indicting the accused of sexual slavery
and forced marriage as crimes against humanity); Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges (Oct. 14, 2008), at 211 (same, for sexual slavery as a
crime against humanity); see also Kenny & Malik, supra note 7, at 55–56. As Kenny and Malik explain, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kunarac referenced trafficking in discussing the definition of enslavement. The ICTY Prosecutor, however, never formally charged
the three persons accused in that case of trafficking. Id.
11.
See, e.g. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4; Convention of the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; G.A. Res. 44/25,
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989); G.A. Res. 45/158, International Convention
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
(1990); G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966);
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(1966); Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, May
16, 2005, C.E.T.S. No. 197 (entered into force Feb. 1, 2008), https://www.coe.int/en/web/
conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/197 [Council of Europe Convention on Action
against Trafficking in Human Beings]; SAARC Convention on Preventing and Combating
Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution pmbl., Jan. 5, 2002, http://saarcsec.org/digital_library/detail_menu/saarc-convention-on-preventing-and-combatingtrafficking-in-women-and-children-for-prostitution.
12.
See generally Kenny & Malik, supra note 7 (arguing for the need to judicially address the link between human trafficking, sexual and gender-based violence, and terrorism);
Harmen van der Wilt, Trafficking in Human Beings, Enslavement, Crimes against Humanity:
Unravelling the Concepts, 13 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 297 (2014) (arguing that jurisdiction over
the crime of enslavement belongs to the ICTs while other forms of trafficking are better left to
national courts); Loring Jones et al, Globalization and Human Trafficking, 34 J. SOC. & SOC.
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begin to introduce, investigate, and prosecute trafficking cases—particularly
13
14
in peacetime situations, where most instances of trafficking occur. Focusing on three archetypal peacetime trafficking situations to which the Office
of the Prosecutor (the “OTP”) could direct resources, it finds that there is
space for the ICC to play a greater role in the international effort to combat
this crime. And endowed with this ability, it should do more.
To date, ICTs have examined crimes against humanity only in the con15
text of conflicts. At the ICC, this may be due to the OTP’s budgetary con16
straints. As investigations of international crimes involve a gargantuan
analysis of hundreds, even thousands of pieces of evidence and witnesses,

WELFARE 107 (2007) (analyzing how the dynamics of globalization fueled the growth of human trafficking); ANNE T. GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING
216 (2010) (giving an overview of the various frameworks that exist in international law to
address human trafficking).
13.
The Wolters Kluwer Bouvier Law Dictionary provides that “[p]eace as a matter of
international law is a condition of stability between states among whom there is no armed
conflict or threat of imminent armed conflict.” Peace, WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW
DICTIONARY (2011). Trafficking that occurs in peacetime, i.e., in an atmosphere free of either
cross-border or internal conflict, will be referred to as “peacetime trafficking” throughout.
14.
Myths, Facts, and Statistics (2018), POLARIS PROJECT, https://polarisproject.org/
myths-facts-and-statistics (last visited Apr. 20, 2020); United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime [UNODC], Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, at 11 (2018),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/2018/GLOTiP_2018_BOOK_
web_small.pdf [hereinafter Global Report on Trafficking in Persons].
15.
Sonja Starr, Extraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times: International Justice Beyond
Crisis Situations, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1257, 1258 (2007). For an explanation of international
criminal law’s conflict focus, see generally id., at 1260–70 (explaining that international criminal tribunals tend to rely on Nuremburg jurisprudence and international humanitarian law
when interpreting the elements of crimes against humanity and that scholarship frequently
labels international criminal tribunals as “war crimes tribunals”).
16.
For an overview of the ICC’s budget, see generally International Criminal Court
Assembly of States Parties, Proposed Programme Budget for 2019 of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/17/10 (Aug. 1, 2018), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/
ASP17/ICC-ASP-17-10-ENG.pdf. Pages 8 to 12 provide a concise list of the budget priorities
of the Court as well as its main cost drivers. See also Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ¶ 95 (Apr.
12, 2019) [hereinafter Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] (declining to open an
investigation into crimes committed in Afghanistan due to the significant amount of resources
the case would require and the limited financial and human resources of the OTP); Lilian
Ochieng & Simon Jennings, International Criminal Court Secures Budget Increase, DAILY
NATION (Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.nation.co.ke/news/International-Criminal-CourtBudget-Increase/-/1056/2150244/-/e7oca3/-/index.html (“Five of [the OTP’s] cases––three of
them in Kenya––have failed to come to trial because of lack of evidence. [. . . The OTP’s]
ability to launch successful prosecutions [. . .] has been hampered by a range of factors, but
most boil down to lack of money.”); Jonathan O’Donohue, The International Criminal Court
at Risk, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 6, 2015, 8:24 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/
2015/05/06/international-criminal-court-risk (“The prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, has stated
that she has been obliged to scale down resources for investigations into ongoing crimes in
Libya, in order to be trial ready in other cases beyond Libya.”).

2020]

Increasing Case Traffic at the ICC

545

the OTP’s limited budget forces it to be selective in its prosecutions. It may
be that the OTP more readily investigates situations involving war or internal conflict because they emerge as the most egregious ICL violations.
Perhaps as well conflict is more visible, making the elements of these
crimes easier to prove. It may be that the OTP has considered charging an
individual with trafficking, but ultimately dropped the accusation because of
a concern that the Pre-Trial Chamber would not confirm it for insufficient
17
evidence. This is especially important in situations where the state or states
18
in which the crime is to be investigated threaten non-cooperation.
For the purposes of this note, however, the systemic constraints on the
Court’s ability to consider peacetime trafficking cases will not be considered at length; rather, this piece aims to plant the seeds for prosecuting labor
and sex trafficking by envisioning and illustrating the types of peacetime
cases that would satisfy the elements of article 7.
As will be shown, the Rome Statute does not contain legal barriers to
19
prosecuting peacetime trafficking, and the ICC can and should do more to
combat this crime within its existing framework. Part II begins by discussing the pervasive nature of the crime and some of its root causes, introducing why international responses are necessary to address trafficking. Part III
considers the added value that ICC action would bring to trafficking accountability through the lens of the accomplishments and limitations of the
Trafficking Protocol and its complementary international anti-trafficking
regime. Part IV evaluates the Rome Statute’s codification of trafficking as
an actus reus for crimes against humanity, arguing that the text of article 7
supports the prosecution of trafficking cases in general and presents no facial barriers to bringing peacetime trafficking cases before the Court. Finally,
Part V analyzes three archetypal peacetime trafficking situations that are so
systemic that they satisfy article 7 and could be charged as cases of trafficking at the Court.

17.
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
Before an individual’s trial is held, the Pre-Trial Chamber conducts a hearing to confirm the
charges. Pursuant to article 61(7) of the Rome Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber must determine
“whether there exists sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the
person committed each of the crimes charged” by the OTP. “The purpose of the pre-trial proceedings, and specifically of the confirmation hearing, is to determine whether the case as presented by the Prosecutor is sufficiently established to warrant a full trial.” See also Prosecutor
v. Ongwen, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra note 9, ¶14.
18.
See Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Decision Pursuant to Article
15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ¶ 44.
19.
Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 7.
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II. A Crime of Far-Reaching Consequences Requiring a
Global Response
Trafficking is a crime worthy of global attention—including attention at
the ICC—for at least three reasons. First, trafficking is a pervasive and evergrowing crime. There are an estimated 24.9 million individuals being traf20
ficked worldwide, including victims of both sex and labor trafficking. Between 2007 and 2016, the number of trafficking victims in the world in21
creased by approximately 38%. Even these numbers, shocking as they are,
are only conservative estimates, as challenges innate to measuring an often
invisible population (e.g., traffickers forcing victims to stay silent, or victims electing to remain silent about their experiences for fear of the stigma
they may face from their families or communities) lead to inconsistent or
22
non-reporting of incidents.
Second, trafficking produces a host of grave consequences that contravene many nearly universally-recognized human rights designed to protect
23
one’s person that states have pledged to protect, including individuals’
20.
Global Estimates of Modern Slavery, supra note 3, at 9–10.
21.
Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, supra note 14, at 22. Compare ILO 2012
Global Estimate of Forced Labour Executive Summary, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION (June 2012), https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/publications/
WCMS_181953/lang—en/index.htm (placing the number of global trafficking victims in
2012 at 20.9 million), with Global Estimates of Modern Slavery, supra note 3, at 9) (placing
the number of global trafficking victims at 24.9 million in 2016).
22.
See Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, supra note 14, at 15.
23.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) is not a treaty, and therefore the document itself does not have binding effect on the conduct of states. Despite this,
some experts consider the document to reflect customary international law on human rights.
See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J.
Rep. 16, 76 (June 21) (separate opinion by Ammoun, Vice-President) (“Although the affirmations of the Declaration are not binding qua international convention . . . they can bind States
on the basis of custom . . . whether because they constituted a codification of customary
law . . . or because they have acquired the force of custom through a general practice accepted
as law[.]”); South West Africa Cases (Liber. v. S. Afr.), Second Phase, 1966 I.C.J. Rep. 6, at
250, 293 (July 18) (dissenting opinion by Tanaka, J.); Digital Record of the UDHR, U.N.
HUM. RTS. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R (Feb. 2009), https://www.ohchr.org/
EN/NEWSEVENTS/Pages/DigitalrecordoftheUDHR.aspx (“The Universal Declaration was
not merely congruent with some customs and foreign to other cultures. It drew its principles
from many diverse traditions, and it made them more robust through a uniform codification.”). In any case, the UDHR later became the foundation for the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), both of which contain binding obligations on State Parties. See
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR], Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. Both treaties have nearly universal participation: The ICCPR has 74
signatories and 173 parties. UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, Status: ICCPR,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=
4&clang=_en (last visited May 30, 2020). And the ICESCR has 71 signatories and 170 parties. UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, Status: ICCPR, https://treaties.un.org/

2020]

Increasing Case Traffic at the ICC
24

547

25

rights to security of person, freedom from servitude and degrading treat26
27
ment, and a standard of living that ensures health and well-being. It directly affects security of person because its victims, who are often members
of vulnerable populations, are prone to becoming targets of physical, psy28
chological, and emotional violence. Traffickers often use coercive tactics
to initiate relationships with their victims and force them to remain in servi29
tude after they have expressed a desire to escape. Victims can also be subjected to egregious, degrading living situations, ranging from poorly kept
and even dangerous homes to obliterated privacy, with traffickers monitor30
ing their victims’ every move. Often, victims are harmed by excessive or
31
dangerous work conditions. Victims of sex trafficking are prone to serious
32
health risks, including HIV/AIDS and severe mental health issues like anx33
iety, insecurity, fear, trauma, and PTSD. They rarely, if ever, have free ac34
cess to basic necessities, like food, sleep, hygiene, and medical care, and
their families and communities may socially ostracize them, which prevents
35
them from engaging with society or seeking help.
Third, trafficking also contravenes economic and social rights enshrined
in international legal instruments. Both the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights emphasize, for example, every individual’s right to free choice of
36
37
employment and just remuneration. Upon a cursory glance of the situation, it may seem that victims of trafficking receive exactly the compensation the market demands for their work. But the reality is, that unskilled laborers, who are already limited in what jobs they can perform, cannot afford
to be selective about their work conditions when workers willing to perform
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4 (last visited May 30,
2020).
24.
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 3 (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 9.
25.
UDHR, supra note 24, art. 4; ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 8.
26.
UDHR, supra note 24, art. 5; ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 7.
27.
UDHR, supra note 24, art. 25; ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 7.
28.
Impact of Human Trafficking on Victims and Survivors, HUMAN TRAFFICKING
SEARCH, http://humantraffickingsearch.org/impact/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2020).
29.
Id.
30.
Taking a Lesson From Traffickers: Harnessing Technology To Further the AntiTrafficking Movement’s Principal Goals, U.S. MISSION TO THE OSCE (Apr. 8, 2019),
https://osce.usmission.gov/taking-a-lesson-from-traffickers-harnessing-technology-to-furtherthe-anti-trafficking-movement.
31.
Impact of Human Trafficking on Victims and Survivors, supra note 28.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
36.
UDHR supra note 24, art. 23(1); ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 6.
37.
UDHR, supra note 24, art. 23(3); ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 7(a)(i).
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the job in the same conditions for less could readily replace them. As a result, laborers accept jobs no matter how long the hours may be or how degrading the work or conditions are. So by opportunistically decreasing the
cost of labor to satisfy the global demand for cheap goods and services, par38
ticularly from wealthier countries, trafficking pigeon-holes laborers—
especially laborers with few other skills—into a situation of little-to-no economic power, encouraging and exacerbating their poverty. Such wage depreciation allows the rich to maintain and grow their enormous wealth, at
the cost of entrapping victims and their progeny in a cycle of poverty. Most
will never earn nearly enough to have the buying power to leave these conditions, and they consequently cannot escape trafficking. If one of the international community’s goals is to realize “the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want,” the continued existence of trafficking
39
will make this end unattainable.
Ultimately, trafficking thus cuts against initiatives advanced by the international community to ensure such rights are universally respected by
taking advantage of the global desire for cheap products, widely demanded
by individuals and states worldwide. The global community is therefore partially responsible, and can only make right if it also initiates a coordinated
response. Indeed, it may be difficult for victims to independently discern
40
those wages and relationships that are exploitative, due to the “push” and
41
“pull” factors that drive individuals from countries lacking in economic
42
opportunity into countries with higher levels of prosperity. Traffickers use
this push and pull dynamic as a recruitment tool by promising victims a bet43
ter life and increased opportunity. And given their vulnerability, victims

38.
See Dana Raigrodski, Economic Migration Gone Wrong: Trafficking in Persons
Through the Lens of Gender, Labor, and Globalization, 25 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 79,
100 (2015).
39.
ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 1(1).
40.
Push factors for trafficking, i.e., the conditions lending to an individual’s vulnerability in the first place, include: high unemployment and poverty, with little to no chance of
leaving the situation; discriminatory labor markets; lack of opportunity to improve one’s quality of life; gender or ethnic discrimination; internal conflict and persecution, domestic violence or abuse; and the proliferation of human rights violations. See Luz Estella Nagle, Selling
Souls: The Effect of Globalization on Human Trafficking and Forced Servitude, 26 WIS. INT’L
L.J. 131, 137–38 (2008).
41.
Pull factors for trafficking, i.e., the conditions allowing perpetrators to capitalize on
victims’ vulnerabilities, include: awareness of a demand for labor, no matter how cheap; the
fundamental desire to achieve a better life; the relative frequency and efficiency of transportation structures to support trafficking; a high number of facilitators and consumers benefitting
from this exploitation; the existence of weak or no laws against forced servitude; a lack of
public awareness that trafficking is occurring; government corruption; weak law enforcement;
and entrenched organized crime networks. Id. at 138–39.
42.
Jones et al., supra note 12, at 112.
43.
Id. at 113.
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are often not in a position to discern the gross exaggerations of traffickers.
44
Trafficking victims need another institution to step in.
Such help could come from the government of the state in which they
45
are trafficked, but where national-level initiatives fall short, the international community must provide a fallback. One such response could come
from enforcement of the Trafficking Protocol, an anti-transnational organized crime treaty discussed in the next section. Another could come from
ICC investigation and prosecution of state officials (or individuals with
powers similar thereto) that have become entangled in, or perpetrated, traf46
ficking.
Note that neither the definition of trafficking in Part I nor the reasons
trafficking merits global attention, discussed here, suggest that trafficking
necessitates violence or a conflict-ridden atmosphere. Rather, these two
parts have illustrated that trafficking cases can crop up in coercive situations
in times of relative peace and have severe, long lasting effects, both for individuals and economies. This peacetime trafficking, like trafficking more
broadly, calls for a response at the international level in addition to the national one. As put by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, “If the rule
of law is undermined not only in one country, but in many, then those who
47
defend it cannot limit themselves to purely national means.”

III. The Trafficking Protocol and a Complementary Role
for the Court
A. The Trafficking Protocol’s Scope
In an effort to provide an international response to transnational organized crime, in 2000 the General Assembly adopted the Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, along with three supplemental protocols on
trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, and illicit manufacturing and
48
trafficking in firearms (known collectively as the “Palermo Protocols”).
The Convention’s Trafficking Protocol is the principal international instrument addressing human trafficking and is an important starting point for un-

44.
Id.
45.
See infra notes 66–69.
46.
See Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 4 (“The Court may exercise its functions and
powers, as provided in this Statute, on the territory of any State Party and, by special agreement, on the territory of any other State.”), art. 86 (“States Parties shall, in accordance with
the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”).
47.
U.N. Secretary-General, Address at the Opening of the Signing Conference for the
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Dec. 12, 2000),
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/about-unodc/speeches/speech_2000-12-12_1.html.
48.
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15,
2000, T.I.A.S. 13,127, 2225 U.N.T.S 209.
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derstanding how the crime is defined, the parallel accountability system it
provides, and how the ICC could step in to provide victims with additional
49
justice and deterrence.
The Trafficking Protocol is the culmination of a global effort to harmonize the concept of trafficking in order to better combat the crime at the in50
ternational level. The treaty has been ratified by 176 parties and is conceived as providing a common definition of trafficking and its constitutive
51
52
elements. It has inspired national trafficking laws and has even influenced the European Court of Human Rights’ interpretation of its own con53
vention. The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor has also recognized the Proto54
col as instructive in interpreting article 7 of the Rome Statute.
The Trafficking Protocol’s definition of trafficking is particularly noteworthy for its rejection of consent as a potential defense to a trafficking allegation and its treatment of coercion as an element of the crime. First, arti55
cle 3(b) states that consent is “irrelevant” to the definition. This key
feature bars traffickers from using victims’ consent—which may, in fact,
56
have been coerced—as a defense to the crime. Second, the Protocol recognizes exploitation, rather than the victim’s non-consent, as the defining cri-

49.
See Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4.
50.
Zelalem Shiferaw Woldemichael, Criminalization and Prosecution of Human Trafficking in Ethiopia, 4 BRICS L.J. 116 (2017).
51.
Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4.
52.
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, Status: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, https://treaties.un.org/
pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-a&chapter=18&clang=_en (last
visited May 31, 2020). See also Victim of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000,
H.R. 3244, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000); Modern Slavery Act 2015, 63 Eliz. 2, c. 30 (Eng.); INT’L
LABOUR ORG., P029—Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (June 11,
2014); Marley S. Weiss, Human Trafficking and Forced Labor: A Primer, 31 A.B.A. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 1, 19 (2015) (“The ILO designed the Forced Labour Protocol to complement the
UN Palermo Protocol [on trafficking].”); Council of Europe Convention on Action Against
Trafficking in Human Beings, supra note 11; Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children, E.U-A.U., Nov. 22–23, 2006 (requiring member states to abide by the Trafficking Protocol’s anti-trafficking provisions).
53.
EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS., Guide on Article 4 of the European Convention on Human
Rights: Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour, ¶¶ 53–54, (Dec. 31, 2019),
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_4_ENG.pdf (citing Rantsev v. Cyprus &
Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. 25965/04, Jan. 7, 2010, ¶ 285).
54.
See Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Policy on Children 22 n.58
(2016),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/20161115_OTP_ICC_Policy-on-Children_
Eng.pdf.
55.
Id. at 21.
56.
Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions
to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437, 445 (2006).
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57

terion of trafficking. Thus, the definitional phrase “the threat or use of
force” is not confined to violent acts. Instead, the force element may be
“understood to refer to any situation in which the person involved has no
58
real and acceptable alternative but to submit to the abuse involved.” Together, these features allow the Trafficking Protocol to cover a wide range
of acts, from direct, physical threats against victims to the exploitation of a
coercive living situation, consistent with the causes and consequences of
trafficking identified in Part II.
Another important feature of the Trafficking Protocol is that it requires
all States Parties to create or strengthen existing training for law enforcement, immigration officers, and other relevant officials on investigating,
59
prosecuting, and ultimately preventing trafficking. Such measures are key
to identifying victims (both directly and through improved evidence collection), which, in turn, will save more victims from their situations, lead to
higher accountability of perpetrators, and help states to better understand
whether particular anti-trafficking approaches are working or not.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (“UNODC”), the agency responsible for implementing the Protocol, issues an annual global report
on trafficking that summarizes the domestic measures adopted and cases
60
pursued by States Parties. Notably, as the Protocol has been implemented
61
by states over time, data collection of trafficking victims has improved.
According to UNODC, in 2009 only twenty-six countries had a government
institution charged with systematically collecting and disseminating data on
62
63
trafficking cases. By 2018, this number had risen to sixty-five.
But while global investigation and prosecution of trafficking has improved, prosecution statistics and an overall increase in trafficking victims
indicate that much work can still be done to increase accountability for indi64
vidual traffickers. While most countries have comprehensive trafficking
legislation, many continue to have low numbers of convictions for traffick-

57.
International Legal Framework—United Nations, LA STRADA INT’L,
http://lastradainternational.org/human-trafficking/legal-framework/united-nations (last visited
Mar. 14, 2020).
58.
U.N. OFFICE OF DRUGS AND CRIME, TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE ELABORATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE PROTOCOLS THERETO, at 347, U.N. Sales No.
E.06.V.5 (2006).
59.
Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4, at 6.
60.
See Trafficking in Persons, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME,
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/data-and-analysis/glotip.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2020).
61.
Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, supra note 14, at 15–16.
62.
Id. at 16.
63.
Id.
64.
See Global Estimates of Modern Slavery, supra note 3.
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65

ing. According to the UN Global Report on Trafficking, of the 136 countries that reported data between 2012 and 2014, only 29% had investigated
more than fifty cases of trafficking in a year. Twenty-three percent had investigated between eleven and fifty cases per year; 11% had investigated ten
66
or fewer cases per year; and 37% had either investigated no cases or pro67
vided no information. Moreover, while some regions have seen an increase
68
69
in convictions, others have not, despite continuing to identify victims.
There are a number of possible reasons for this gap in accountability.
First, many countries have increasingly prioritized national security issues
and consequently may have chosen to crack down on illegal migration and
70
terrorism rather than trafficking per se. In effect, individuals who would
have been identified as victims of trafficking in the past may instead be
71
treated as illegal migrants.
72
Second, domestic trafficking laws are relatively new. Authorities lack
of familiarity with these laws may prompt them to charge trafficking cases
under other statutes that they believe are more likely to end in a successful
prosecution, such as grievous bodily harm, because the evidence necessary
73
to sustain such convictions is easier to identify and gather. But choice not
to engage with the laws, however well-meaning, is cyclical, and it may also
lead to authorities not recognizing, and therefore not pursing, conduct that
74
the Protocol would classify as trafficking.

65.
Id. at 23 (questioning whether the lower number of convictions reflects of investigations and prosecutions of trafficking as a relatively low priority, low levels of trafficking
activity in particular countries, or a limited ability for countries to detect this crime).
66.
Amy Farrell & Brianne Kane, Criminal Justice System Responses to Human Trafficking, in THE PALGRAVE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING (2019).
67.
Id.
68.
Camilo Carrranza, Human Trafficking Conviction Rates on the Rise in Latin America, INSIGHT CRIME (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/humantrafficking-conviction-rates-increasing (noting a 31% increase in conviction rates in Honduras, a 23% increase in Ecuador, a 22% increase in Argentina, and a 21% increase in both Costa Rica and Guatemala. Bolivia, Uruguay, El Salvador, and Venezuela, however, registered
conviction rates of less than 5% in 2017. In Argentina, conviction rates rose from 52% in
2014 to 74% in 2017, but overall prosecutions dropped from 138 cases to just 51).
69.
Rebecca Ratcliffe, Trafficking Convictions Fall 25% Despite Rising Number of Victims in Europe, GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2019) (“A report by the UN found that 742 people in Europe were convicted for trafficking offences in 2016, the latest year for which there is available data, compared with 988 in 2011. The number of identified victims increased from 4,248
to 4,429 over the same period.”).
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
For example, exploitative forced prison labor, as discussed infra Part V, may not be
recognized as trafficking per se because society has traditionally conceived of it as a fair
payment for one’s transgressions or wrongdoings.
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Third, some States Parties have chosen to target a narrower scope of
conduct in their own domestic trafficking legislation (allowing, for example,
victim consent to be a defense). This leads to far fewer cases investigated
and prosecuted in those states than in states that have adopted definitions of
75
trafficking that more closely align with the Trafficking Protocol’s.

B. Using the ICC to Expand Prosecution of Trafficking at the
International Level
Under the Trafficking Protocol, a State Party that wishes to bring a trafficking case against another State Party may invoke arbitration, and, if the
states fail to agree on how to conduct the arbitration, seize the International
76
Court of Justice to ensure compliance. However, the Protocol does not
create its own prosecution office or provide any means to initiate investigation and prosecution of individual perpetrators. Instead, it relies on states to
take direct action on their own by conducting domestic prosecutions, with,
as discussed above, varying degrees of success.
By contrast, the Rome Statute opens an avenue for investigation at the
international level: Parties to the Statute, the OTP itself, and the UN Security Council can each initiate proceedings before the ICC against suspected
77
perpetrators. If they begin to do so, the prosecutions would provide a more
direct response to trafficking crimes, especially where states have been unable or unwilling to prosecute domestically. Moreover, when it becomes
clear that the Court will hear trafficking cases, States Parties will have a particular incentive to pursue these crimes, as non-compliance with their obligations under the Rome Statute may subject their leaders to an investigation
by the Court that the Trafficking Protocol cannot replicate.
The Court could serve a dual role in the trafficking space: establishing
fact patterns for domestic law enforcement to watch in the future, and holding state officials accountable for permitting or creating the conditions for
trafficking to occur. It could also help unify the laws on human trafficking
across national jurisdictions, as parties to the Rome Statute are expected to
bring their laws and law enforcement into compliance with Court jurispru78
dence. This role would align with the Court’s existing efforts to strengthen
domestic jurisdictions’ capacities to prosecute other crimes contained in the
79
Rome Statute. Simply, ICC litigation would not replace domestic prosecutions; rather, in hearing trafficking cases, the Court would complement domestic efforts by advising States Parties on the requirements of the Rome

75.
Michelle Madden Dempsey et al., Defining Sex Trafficking in International and
Domestic Law: Mind the Gaps, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 137, 141 (2012).
76.
Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4, art. 15.
77.
See generally Rome Statute, supra note 17.
78.
Id.
79.
See generally Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, Report of the Bureau
on Complementarity, ICC-ASP/16/33 (Dec. 4, 2017).
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Statute and how to effectively investigate and prosecute the crimes included
80
therein.
The idea that the ICC could prosecute trafficking is not a novel one:
81
Previous scholarship has arrived at the same conclusion, and the OTP
82
agrees that it has the ability to prosecute these cases. The idea that the ICC
83
could complement the Trafficking Protocol framework is equally familiar.
Little has been discussed, however, beyond hypothetical fact patterns that fit
84
within the Rome Statute’s framework on their face. There has been minimal engagement with how these cases would actually fare in practice in
light of ICT jurisprudence, or with how prosecution of certain kinds of trafficking in peacetime, rather than in the context of conflict, could fit within
85
the ambit of the Rome Statute. The rest of this note addresses that deficit.

IV. Peacetime Trafficking Could Be Prosecuted Under the
Rome Statute
This part analyzes the Rome Statute’s treatment of trafficking from two
angles. First, it assesses the language used to codify the crime, found in the
Rome Statute’s article 7, and second, it applies those article 7 elements to
situations in practice, in light of the Court’s case law. As will be shown, neither the Statute’s codification of trafficking as a crime with slavery-like elements nor the threshold elements of article 7 prevent the Court from trying
peacetime trafficking cases.

A. Trafficking Codified in the Rome Statute
While the Rome Statute does not expressly include trafficking as an actus reus of crimes against humanity (the crime described by article 7), the
text of article 7 and its interpretation by the ICC and other tribunals clarify
80.
Id. at 25–26.
81.
See, e.g., Julia Crawford, Could The ICC Address Human Trafficking as an International Crime?, JUSTICEINFO.NET (June 17, 2019), https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/
tribunals/icc/41684-could-icc-address-human-trafficking-international-crime.html (explaining
that the OTP could demonstrate that a case of human trafficking fulfills the definition of enslavement or torture, and therefore could be pursued by the Court); John Cooper Green, A
Proposal Leading to an International Court to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings 25–26
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Library System);
Kenny & Malik, supra note 7; Melanie O’Brien, Prosecuting Peacekeepers in the ICC for
Human Trafficking, 1 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 281 (2006).
82.
See Int’l Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Statement to the U.N. Security
Council on the Situation in Libya, Pursuant to UNSCR 1970, ¶ 38 (May 9, 2019),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180509-otp-stat-UNSC-lib.
83.
U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RTS., Human Rights and Human Trafficking Fact
Sheet No. 36, at 58 (2014), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FS36_en.pdf.
84.
Jane Kim, Prosecuting Human Trafficking as a Crime Against Humanity Under the
Rome Statute, parts II, III (Feb. 2011) (on file with the Columbia University Law School).
85.
See, e.g., Kim, supra note 84; Kenny & Malik, supra note 7.
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that human trafficking—both sex and labor trafficking—falls under the ambit of crimes against humanity.
Textually, the ICC’s jurisdiction over trafficking derives from two article 7 provisions related to slavery. The first is article 7(1)(g), which encom86
passes trafficking of an exclusively sexual nature, i.e., trafficking involving penetration or other exploitative use of the genitals. Article 7(1)(g)
explicitly codifies “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity” as acts that, meeting the other threshold requirements of
87
this article, would constitute crimes against humanity. The Elements of
88
Crimes—the document that assists the Court in interpreting article 7 —
89
clarifies that sex trafficking falls within the scope of sexual slavery.
The other relevant provision is article 7(1)(c), which codifies “enslave90
ment” as a crime against humanity. In article 7(2)(c), the Rome Statute
goes on to define “enslavement” as the “exercise of any or all of the powers
attaching to the right of ownership over a person . . . includ[ing] the exercise
of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, particularly women
91
and children.” Again, the Elements of Crimes establishes that enslavement
92
includes trafficking in persons. Thus, article 7(1)(c) should be understood
to encompass all forms of trafficking lacking a sexual element, since sex
trafficking is covered by 7(1)(g). Notably, neither provision appears to limit
prosecutable trafficking to acts committed in the context of conflict or violence.
The way the Rome Statute addresses trafficking is controversial. The
division of slavery (and, consequently, trafficking) into two separate actus
reī was criticized by some state delegates when the Rome Statute was being
negotiated. Those delegates advocated consolidating the two forms of the
crime into a single one in order to reduce overlap in the Rome Statute’s
93
coverage. In particular, at the point that article 7(1)(c) categorizes trafficking as slavery, it would seem that enslavement would encompass both labor
trafficking and sexual trafficking, as sexual slavery seems to be but a specific form of slavery. Not only would this seem to be logical, these representatives argued, but it would also avoid confusion and “ensure that the Statute
only contained the most serious crimes of concern to the international com86.
Int’l Criminal Court, ICC RC/11, Elements of Crimes 8 (2010) (requiring that
“[t]he perpetrator caused [one or more persons] to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature” to meet the definition of sexual slavery) [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes].
87.
Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 7(1)(g) (emphasis added).
88.
Id. art. 9.
89.
ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 86, at 8 n.18.
90.
Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 7(1)(c) (emphasis added).
91.
Id. art. 7(2)(c) (emphasis added).
92.
ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 86, at 6 n.11.
93.
Valerie Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal Court: Advancing International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605, 622–23 (2004).
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94

munity as a whole.” Otherwise, these representatives feared that expanding
the list of prosecutable crimes would dilute their seriousness from the per95
spective of the international community.
Yet, the two forms of slavery are not the same act, and the violation of a
victim’s sexuality adds a dimension of intimacy that cannot be glossed over.
Consequently, other states emphasized that there could be instances where
the ICC wishes to charge an accused individual of crimes against humanity
96
in the form of both enslavement and sexual slavery. One could envision
situations where a defendant is accused of subjecting victims to different
97
forms of slavery, namely sexual versus non-sexual, for example.
That said, the ICC has acknowledged the facial contradiction in separating sexual slavery from the broader category of enslavement, but has noted
that “sexual violence violations were considered best to be grouped togeth98
er.” This makes sense: Given the societal stigma that may be involved with
sex crimes, victims of sexual slavery may need different or increased pro99
tective measures or redress. The actus reus of “sexual slavery” was intended specifically to protect sexual autonomy, whereas “enslavement” is an
all-encompassing category for any crime that involves power attaching to
the ownership of a person, regardless of the acts that the victims are re100
quired to perform. By creating a separate actus reus for sexual slavery, the
delegates ultimately embraced “the specific nature of the form of enslave101
ment and ensure[d] that it will be given the distinct attention it deserves.”

94.
Id. at 623.
95.
Id. Some delegates believed there was a tension between, on the one hand, the Statute creating accountability for the most serious crimes that one could commit (putting all the
codified crimes on equal footing in terms of severity), and, on the other hand, the addition of
more (and especially more nuanced) crimes, which could suggest differing degrees of severity
between the crimes. Codifying “sexual slavery,” a particular form of slavery, suggests (at least
symbolically) that there is something special or unique about this case that puts it on a different footing than slavery or enslavement per se.
96.
Id. at 624.
97.
For example, the Nazi state established bordellos catering to male inmates of concentration camps to provide them an incentive to work harder. Female inmates who were
forced to work as prostitutes in these bordellos were forced to fulfill a quota of eight men per
day. The Nazi government thus forced different subsets of inmates to perform fundamentally
different kinds of work—some involving sex and some not. See NANDA HERBERMANN, THE
BLESSED ABYSS: INMATE #6582 IN RAVENSBRÜCK CONCENTRATION CAMP FOR WOMEN 33–
34 (2000).
98.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgment, ¶ 541 n.1333 (Trial
Chamber, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001) (stating in full, “the setting out of the violations in separate sub-paragraphs of the ICC Statute is not to be interpreted
as meaning . . . that sexual slavery is not a form of enslavement. This separation is to be explained by the fact that the sexual violence violations were considered best to be grouped together”)
99.
Id.
100.
Id.
101.
Oosterveld, supra note 93, at 624.
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The drafters’ choice to categorize trafficking as “slavery” or as a crime
involving slavery-like characteristics in the first place suggests that a trafficking crime must exhibit the abuse of power attaching to the ownership of
102
a person in order for the Court to analyze it. But, as mentioned above,
many instances of trafficking occur through exploitative or coercive practic103
es without actual ownership. In the ICC’s Elements of Crimes, both enslavement and sexual slavery are described as requiring the act in question
to involve any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership, and
both entries specify that these powers include “purchasing, selling, lending
104
or bartering such a person or persons” or a similar deprivation of liberty.
This explanation seems to suggest that, in order to fall under the Rome Statute, trafficking must include some exchange of commerce or similar indicia
constituting formal ownership of a person in a manner similar to chattel
slavery.
But if the prosecution of enslavement or sexual slavery required a
showing of ownership, the scope of prosecutable trafficking cases would be
extremely narrow. Chattel slavery of this kind, such as was formerly practiced in the United States, rarely exists anymore, and would face global
105
backlash. This would also be a significant narrowing from the definition
102.
Kevin Bales and Peter Robbins claim that the Elements of Crimes codification of
“enslavement” simply restates the 1926 Slavery Convention’s definition of slavery “with the
addition of the practice of trafficking.” Kevin Bales & Peter T. Robbins, No One Shall Be
Held in Slavery or Servitude, 2 HUM. RTS. REV. 18, 26 (2001). Under this view, in effect,
where trafficking can be established under the Statute, so too can the behavior required to establish enslavement. Id. In contrast, Barbara Bedont argues that the addition of trafficking altered the Slavery Convention’s definition of enslavement, establishing “a new definition of
enslavement which includes trafficking in persons.” Barbara Bedont, Gender-Specific Provisions in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, in 1 ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 183, 199 (1999) (emphasis added). Jean Allain
emphasizes that the Rome Statute codifies enslavement––not slavery––and thereby “does not
add trafficking as an additional type of slavery [but rather] acknowledges that slavery is but
one possible component part of the definition of trafficking.” JEAN ALLAIN, THE SLAVERY
CONVENTIONS: THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE 1926 LEAGUE OF NATIONS
CONVENTION AND THE 1956 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 231 (2008). In other words, Allain takes the view that the article 7(2)(c) reference to trafficking does not modify the codified
crime of enslavement; rather, the elements of enslavement may help contextualize but do not
limit what trafficking cases may look like. Finally, Anne Gallagher, taking a self-pronounced
“conservative” approach to interpreting article 7(1)(c) asserts the inverse, stating that trafficking is a vehicle––akin to buying, selling, and lending––to the “exercise of a power attaching to
the right of ownership of the kind required to constitute enslavement” and must satisfy the
ownership requirement to be a crime against humanity. GALLAGHER, supra note 12, at 216
(2010) (emphasis in original).
103.
See supra Part II; see also Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4, art. 3(a).
104.
ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 86, at 6, 8.
105.
The prohibition of slavery is generally agreed to be a jus cogens norm. See UDHR,
supra note 24, art. 4; ICCPR, supra note 23, art. 8; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 68 (1997);
U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Hum. Rts., Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices During Armed Conflict: Final Report Submitted by
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of the Trafficking Protocol, which shows that ownership is not a necessary
element of trafficking (though it may be a sufficient one); rather, exploitation is key, regardless of the formal relationship between perpetrator and
106
victim. Consequently, scholars have debated exactly how trafficking fits
within the Rome Statute’s definition of enslavement and what actually
107
needs to be established to find that trafficking has occurred.

B. Judicial Interpretations of the Article 7 Slavery Provisions
While the ICC has not yet had the opportunity to clarify the relationship
108
between trafficking and enslavement, the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) expressed that enslavement encompasses a much wider range of conduct than the traditional conception of
chattel slavery in Prosecutor v. Kunarac. In that case, the ICTY’s prosecutor charged defendants Kunarac and Kovač with the enslavement and rape
of Muslim women for the defendants’ sexual gratification. The Trial Chamber adopted a definition for enslavement as a crime against humanity similar
109
to that of slavery in the 1926 Slavery Convention and the Rome Statute.
Despite the narrowness of that definition, the ICTY nonetheless observed
that “enslavement” may be broader than traditional definitions of slavery,
the slave trade, servitude, or compulsory labor found in other areas of inter110
national law. In other words, the Trial Chamber found “enslavement” re-

Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur, ¶ 28, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (June 22,
1998), https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f44114.html.
106.
Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4, art. 3(a).
107.
See supra note 102.
108.
In the only relevant case before the ICC, the OTP brought charges of enslavement
in Prosecutor v. Ongwen. The Pre-Trial Chamber, however, did not elaborate on the elements
or indicia of enslavement, likely because pre-trial proceedings function as probable cause
hearings rather than full analyses on the merits. See Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Case No. ICC02/04-01/15, Pre-Trial Judgment (Mar. 23, 2016). As the Chamber confirmed the charges—
including enslavement—against defendant Ongwen, the Trial Chamber will have the opportunity to further elaborate on the elements of enslavement if it so chooses. See ICC Press Release, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II Confirms the Charges Against Dominic Ongwen and Commits Him to Trial, ICC-CPI-20160323-PR1202 (Mar. 23, 2016). The Trial Chamber heard
closing statements in March 2020, and is still in deliberation at the time of the publication of
this piece. ICC Press Release, ICC Trial Chamber IX to Deliberate on the Ongwen Case, ICCCPI-20200312-PR1519 (Mar. 12, 2020).
109.
Compare Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery art. 1(1), Sept. 25,
1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, Registered No. 1414 [hereinafter Slavery Convention] (defining slavery as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the
right of ownership are exercised”), with Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Judgment, ¶ 539 (defining enslavement as “the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person”), and Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 7(2)(c) (defining enslavement as
“exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person . . . includ[ing] the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, particularly women and children.”).
110.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Judgment, ¶ 541.
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fers not just to slavery, but rather to a whole host of other conduct that may
111
be exploitative or coercive in one way or another. Critically, the Trial
Chamber specifically included compulsory labor without remuneration and
112
human trafficking among the conduct that could constitute enslavement.
To further contextualize the definition of enslavement, the Kunarac
Trial Chamber elaborated that indicia of this crime include, but are not limited to: (1) control of movement; (2) control of physical environment; (3)
control of sexuality; (4) psychological control; (5) forced labor; (6)
measures taken to prevent or deter escape; (7) force; (8) threat of force or
coercion; (9) duration; (10) assertion of exclusivity; and (11) cruel treatment
113
and abuse. While these powers resemble ownership because they exhibit
some level of the perpetrator’s control over another, formal ownership of
114
115
the victim is not required. Likewise, consent of the victim is irrelevant.
However, the Trial Chamber did not elaborate on how to weigh these fac116
tors comparatively, nor did it state that a hierarchy exists among them.
On appeal, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber’s definition of enslavement, the indicia it highlighted, the absence of a complete
ownership requirement, and the definition’s overall evolution away from the
117
narrow concept of slavery embodied in the 1926 Slavery Convention. Under the ICTY’s reading, then, trafficking does not need to be the equivalent
of chattel slavery to constitute enslavement as a crime against humanity. Rather, the prosecutor only needs to demonstrate that a trafficking aggressor
wields power (i.e., any of the conduct described by the Trial Chamber) that
would contribute to a relationship resembling ownership over the victim.
Only the ICC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) have
118
codified sexual slavery as an offense separate from enslavement, but those

111.
Id. ¶ 543.
112.
Id. ¶ 542 (“Further indications of enslavement include exploitation; the exaction of
forced or compulsory labour or service, often without remuneration and often, though not
necessarily, involving physical hardship; sex; prostitution; and human trafficking.”).
113.
Id. ¶ 543.
114.
Id.
115.
Id. ¶ 542.
116.
Id. ¶ 543.
117.
In discussing contemporary forms of slavery, the Appellate Chamber explained that
typical victims are
not subject to the exercise of the more extreme rights of ownership associated with
‘chattel slavery,’ but in all cases, as a result of the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership, there is some destruction of the juridical
personality; the destruction is greater in the case of ‘chattel slavery’ but the difference is one of degree.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 117.
118.
See S.C. Res. 1315, Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 2 (Aug. 14,
2000). The ad hoc tribunals, in contrast, only codify enslavement. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 827,
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 5 (May 25,
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tribunals have both interpreted the actus reus of sexual slavery to share important features with that of enslavement. In Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., the
SCSL emphasized that despite sexual slavery’s separate codification, it “is a
particularized form of slavery or enslavement[,] and acts which could be
classified as sexual slavery have been prosecuted as enslavement in the
119
past.” Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo, the ICC PreTrial Chamber concluded that sexual slavery “may be regarded as a particu120
lar form of enslavement,” such that “what is encompassed with ‘sexual
121
slavery’ must also be encompassed with ‘enslavement.’” Therefore, to the
extent that enslavement is understood, as it was in Kunerac, to encompass
certain coercive acts even in the absence of ownership, so too can sexual
slavery be understood.
It is worthwhile to note that this interpretation of enslavement aligns
with the aim of a successful coalition of the ICC’s drafters, who wanted to
122
create a provision that would attach to modern manifestations of slavery.
The drafters specifically rejected the proposal of some delegations—
including Costa Rica, Hungary, and Switzerland—to explicitly require
“sexual slavery” to include the treatment of the victim or victims as chat123
tel. Several delegations expressed that such a reference—whether in regard to enslavement or sexual slavery—would be “outdated, inappropriate
and imprecise” and would improperly confine slavery to the actual ownership (as opposed to the more broad “powers of ownership”) of saleable
124
property. Others noted that as modern enslavement often differs from the

1993). Notably, the Kunarac Trial Chamber included the performance of sex and prostitution
as indications of enslavement generally, and by including them there suggested that acts of
that kind could be prosecuted on the basis of exploitation and not only in the presence of chattel slavery. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, ¶ 542.
119.
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶ 155 (Mar. 2, 2009).
120.
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 430 (Sept. 30, 2008).
For the war crime of sexual slavery under article 8(2)(b)(xxii)-2 of the Elements of
Crimes, the perpetrator must: “(i) exercise any or all of the powers attaching to the
right or ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending, or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty; and (ii) cause such person or persons to engage in one or more
acts of a sexual nature.
Id. ¶ 343 (emphasis added).
121.
COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 42 n.48
(Mark Klamberg ed., 2017).
122.
See Roger S. Clark, Crimes Against Humanity and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY 75, 83 (Mauro Politi & Guiseppe Nesi eds., 2001).
123.
Oosterveld, supra note 93, at 629–30.
124.
Id. (citing Eve La Haye, Article 8(2)(v)(xxii)—Rape, Sexual Slavery, Enforced
Prostitution, Forced Pregnancy, Enforced Sterilization, and Sexual Violence, in THE
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classic concept of chattel slavery, the Rome Statute needed to have the ca125
pacity to capture a broader range of similar behavior, or the crime would
have no practical significance in the modern world, thwarting any intention
for the Rome Statute to also target trafficking.
Last, it is also notable that this view fits cleanly with the Trafficking
Protocol’s broad definition of trafficking. A harmonious interpretation of
the Rome Statute with the Trafficking Protocol bolsters the complementing
aspects of these two regimes: If the definitions of trafficking in these two
treaties are in line with each other, it further legitimizes the ICC’s role as a
court of last resort that investigates and prosecutes cases where officials or
authorities of a state party have incited or encouraged trafficking in violation of their state’s obligations to the Trafficking Protocol.
Upon review of the definitions of enslavement and sexual slavery found
in the Rome Statute and ICT case law, it is clear that article 7 encompasses
trafficking. Moreover, it is likely that prosecutable trafficking offenses include a broad range of exploitative behaviors that can occur in both violent
and peaceful contexts. Additional limitations on what constitutes article 7
trafficking are discussed in the section that follows.

C. Human Trafficking and the Article 7 Elements
Not every commission of enslavement or sexual slavery will qualify as
a crime against humanity that the ICC can adjudicate. Rather, to be prosecutable, either act must also meet article 7’s chapeau elements. The chapeau
requires any article 7 actus reus to be committed by an individual associated
with the state or other organization with state-like control “as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population,
126
with knowledge of the attack.” The chapeau is best understood as requiring three elements: (1) that the perpetrator targeted a civilian population
(e.g, through a particular policy); (2) that the perpetrator committed the act
knowingly; and (3) that the attack of which the act was part had a widespread or systematic nature.
127
Facially devoid of reference to violence or conflict, the chapeau, like
the more specific provisions of article 7 relating to trafficking, appears to
128
capture crimes occurring either in times of war or peace. In reviewing
each of the chapeau’s three elements, this section demonstrates that the requirements of article 7 do not bar the Court from reviewing peacetime trafINTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE, 3, 5, 191 (Roy S. Lee et al. eds., 2001).
125.
Id.
126.
Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 7(1).
127.
See infra Part IV.C.1 for an explanation of why the word “attack” does not necessarily implicate violence.
128.
Christopher Hall & Kai Ambos, Article 7: Crimes Against Humanity, in THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 155 (Otto Triffterer &
Kai Ambos eds., 2016).
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ficking cases. At the same time, this section flags possible challenges that
past interpretation of the elements—particularly of the widespread or systematic requirement—may create for these cases.

1. The Policy Requirement: An Attack Directed Against a
Civilian Population
To constitute a crime against humanity, the chapeau requires an “attack,” composed of multiple commissions of the acts listed in article 7,
rooted in a policy espoused by the state or a state-like entity. This is known
as the “policy requirement,” and it essentially prevents one-off crimes or
crime waves (i.e., multiple commissions of a crime that are not connected in
an organized sense) from qualifying as crimes against humanity, even if the
129
rest of the chapeau elements are satisfied.
This requirement—and more specifically the word “attack”—poses no
barrier in itself to prosecuting trafficking cases of a peacetime nature. In analyzing the policy requirement, ICTs have only dealt with attacks arising in
130
conflict-type situations until now, but the text of article 7 and prior ICT
jurisprudence make clear that an “attack” is not confined to military cam131
paigns or other traditional notions. In fact, article 7(2) defines “an attack
directed against any civilian population” as “a course of conduct involving
132
the multiple commission of acts referred to in [article 7(1)].” And the
ICTY Trial Chamber in Stakić emphasized that “an attack . . . is not limited
133
to the use of armed force.” The word “attack” in the Rome Statute thus
departs from its common meaning and takes on the meaning of a strategy or
134
plan that does not necessarily require conflict or violence. Accordingly, as
the ICTY and ICTR have repeatedly made clear in their jurisprudence, any

129.
See Darryl Robinson, Essence of Crimes Against Humanity Raised by Challenges
at ICC, EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 27, 2011), https://www.ejiltalk.org/essence-of-crimes-againsthumanity-raised-by-challenges-at-icc (“Crime waves of unconnected individuals or numerous
spontaneous groups are ‘normal’ crime, not engaging in international jurisdiction. But where
an organization collectively orchestrates or endorses harm against a civilian population, and
the harm reaches the level of ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ violence, then it is no longer ‘normal’ crime but something more sinister, coordinated and dangerous, and warrants international concern.”).
130.
Starr, supra note 15, at 1258.
131.
See Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 623 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T,
Judgment, ¶ 581 (Sept. 2, 1998) (“An attack may also be non violent in nature, like imposing
a system of apartheid . . . or exerting pressure on the population to act in a particular manner.”); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, ¶ 416 (“[An attack] may also encompass situations
of mistreatment of persons taking no active part in hostilities, such as someone in detention.”);
Hall & Ambos, supra note 128.
132.
Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 7(2)(a).
133.
Prosecutor v. Stakić, Judgment, ¶ 623.
134.
Hall & Ambos, supra note 128, at 165.
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mistreatment of a civilian population may constitute an attack, and it need
135
not involve armed forces, hostilities, or any violence at all.
The conclusion that the chapeau does not require article 7 crimes
against humanity to occur within a context of violence is further bolstered
by the fact that article 7 also requires victims to be civilians: Individuals
136
who are not participants of the armed forces or otherwise combatants. By
distinguishing civilians from soldiers—and requiring victims to be civilians—the text reveals that it does not require that the act take place in the
context of active conflict. On the contrary, if article 7 required the victims to
be combatants, rather than civilians, then it would require a backdrop of
137
violence. In other words, while an armed struggle could be occurring in
parallel to an article 7 “attack” against civilians, it is not a necessary circumstance.
There is, of course, more to this first prong of the chapeau—the policy
requirement itself. Article 7(2) requires the attack be “directed” by a state or
an organization—that is, it must be “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State
138
or organizational policy.” As affirmed by both the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals, to constitute the basis of a directed attack “[t]here is no requirement
that [a] policy must be adopted formally as the policy of a state [or organi139
140
zation].” Nor must the policy be stated expressly, clearly, or precisely.
Rather, it is sufficient to show the existence of an implicit or de facto policy
141
that inspired the attack. Additionally, article 7’s allowance that the policy
can come from a state or an organization makes clear that non-state actors
or private individuals exercising de facto power over a region can also be
142
prosecuted for their policies.
135.
See supra note 131.
136.
E.g., Prosecutor v. Stanišić, Case No. IT-03-69-T, Judgment, ¶ 965 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 30, 2013) (referencing the definition of “civilian” found
in Additional Protocol I of the 1949 Geneva Conventions). The presence of soldiers or other
combatants within a targeted group does not deprive it of its civilian character, as a targeted
population need only be predominantly, not completely, civilian in nature. Prosecutor v.
Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Judgment, ¶ 474 (Mar. 24, 2016).
137.
It should be noted, as well, that many (though not all) of the crimes enumerated in
article 7 have a war crimes equivalent under article 8. See generally Rome Statute, supra note
17, art. 8.
138.
Id. art. 7(2)(a).
139.
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 396; Prosecutor
v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of
the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ¶ 81
(Jun. 15, 2009); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, ¶ 580; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 653 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7,
1997).
140.
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 204 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000).
141.
Hall & Ambos, supra note 128, at 245.
142.
Id. at 246–50. As Hall and Ambos explain, there is some controversy surrounding
the question of which non-state entities may qualify to sponsor a policy.
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2. Mens Rea Requirement: Knowledge of the Attack
Article 7 also requires that the perpetrator committed a qualifying attack
with knowledge, i.e. with awareness that it fits within a broader campaign
against the civilian population. This knowledge requirement adds to the
143
Court’s general mens rea requirement in article 30. It serves to create a
nexus between the perpetrator’s acts and the broader widespread or system144
atic attack, and it excludes coincidental acts from qualifying as crimes
145
against humanity.
Article 7 requires a perpetrator be “aware that a widespread or systematic attack on civilian population is taking place and that his action is part of
146
[it.]” It does not require, however, the perpetrator to know the details of
the policy or intend for his acts to support the state or organization carrying
147
out the attack. He does not even need to know that his acts were inhumane
148
or would constitute a crime against humanity. The perpetrator’s motives
149
for contributing to the crime are irrelevant. It is not necessary for the perpetrator to share the purpose or goal behind the attack or to intend to harm
the same civilian population targeted by the broader attack in addition to his
150
own victim. As explained by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, “[i]t is the attack, not the acts of the accused, which must be directed against the target
151
population and the accused need only know that his acts are part thereof.”
Thus, the perpetrator “merely needs to understand the overall context in
152
which his or her acts took place” because it is this context that “increased
the dangerousness of his conduct for the victims or turned this conduct into

143.
1.

Hall & Ambos, supra note 128, at 176. Article 30 (titled “Mental element”) reads:

Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable
for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary court of events.
3. For the purposes of this article, ‘knowledge’ means awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.
‘Know’ and ‘knowingly’ shall be construed accordingly.
144.
Hall & Ambos, supra note 128, at 176.
145.
Id.
146.
Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Further Amended Consolidated Indictment, ¶¶ 221–22.
147.
Id., ¶¶ 221–22; see also Hall & Ambos, supra note 128.
148.
Hall & Ambos, supra note 128, at 176.
149.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 103.
150.
Id.
151.
Id.; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95-14, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004).
152.
Hall & Ambos, supra note 128, at 176.
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153

a contribution to the crimes of others.” This line of reasoning supposes a
sort of risk assessment on the part of the perpetrator: Because he committed
the offense despite knowledge of the greater attack, he took a risk that his
154
acts would be part of the overall attack.
Note that the mens rea requirement restricts who may be indicted, but it
does not restrict the kinds of conduct that may qualify for indictment. It
does not exclude the possibility of prosecuting peacetime trafficking, as
long as the perpetrator acted with knowledge that his act occurred in the
context of an attack against civilians.

3. The Widespread or Systematic Requirement:
Extensiveness of the Crime
The final element of the chapeau requires a perpetrator’s actions to be
of a particular magnitude (or to occur in the context of other actions collectively of that magnitude) in order to qualify as a crime against humanity.
Yet even this element does not categorically bar peacetime trafficking cases.
Neither the Rome Statute nor the ICC’s accompanying Elements of
Crimes elaborate on the meaning of the disjunctive “widespread or systematic attack” standard. In general, though, ICTs have interpreted “widespread” to mean an attack of a “large scale” in terms of both its “nature” and
the “number of victims,” and they have interpreted “systematic” as referring
to “the organised nature of the acts of violence and the improbability of
155
their random occurrence.” Patterns of crimes are therefore evidence of a
systematic attack if they are not shown to be events accidentally repeated on
156
a regular basis.
Critically, the widespread or systematic requirement attaches to an attack as a whole and not to the individual acts that a particular perpetrator
157
contributes to the attack. The perpetrator does not have to personally
commit a widespread or systematic series of acts in order to incur criminal
responsibility; rather, his act or acts must only contribute to the overall con158
text in which a widespread or systematic attack exists. Thus, an individual

153.
Id.
154.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 102.
155.
Id. ¶ 94; Prosecutor v. Bagosora, ICTR-98-41-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 387 (Dec. 14,
2011); Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., ICTR-99-52-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 920 (Nov. 28,
2007); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101.
156.
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101 (“Patterns of crimes, in the sense of
the non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a regular basis, are a common
expression of such systematic occurrence.”).
157.
Hall & Ambos, supra note 128.
158.
As the Ambos and Triffterer commentary to the Rome Statute explains,
If some murders, some rapes, and some beatings take place, each form of conduct
need not be widespread or systematic, if together the acts satisfy either of these
conditions. It follows that the individual’s actions themselves need not be wide-
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defendant can be liable for a wide range of acts that contribute to a crime
against humanity—from directing the attack to providing assistance a single
159
time. As trafficking is often linked to a broader campaign against the civilian population and a broad range of other, sometimes inter-related crimes,
160
such as forcible confinement, forced labor, and enslavement, the Court’s
ability to consider these acts holistically could enable a given instance of
161
trafficking to satisfy the widespread or systematic requirement.
To determine if an attack was widespread or systematic, it must be as162
sessed under the totality of the circumstances. Factors that ICTs have de163
veloped to clarify these two standards include: (1) the scale of the attack;
164
(2) the number of its victims; (3) the nature of the acts underlying the at165
tack; (4) the possible participation of officials or authorities in the at166
167
tack; (5) any identifiable patterns of crimes in the attack; and (6) the

spread or systematic, providing that they form part of such a widespread or systematic attack.
Hall & Ambos, supra note 128. For example, in Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., the ICC PreTrial Chamber considered whether the alleged murder, deportation, and persecution could
constitute crimes against humanity as a widespread or systematic attack. It answered affirmatively, pointing to a context of frequent, repeated acts of violence committed against the civilian population:
[T]he evidence indicates that in the locations included in the charges presented by
the Prosecutor, the amount of burning and destruction of properties, injuries and
murders is among the highest in the whole Kenyan territory. . . . [T]he perpetrators
erected roadblocks around such locations with a view toward intercepting PNU
supporters and attempting to flee, with the aim of eventually killing them . . . [and]
used petrol and other inflammable material to systematically burn down the properties belonging to PNU supporters.
Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., ICC-01/09/01/11, Pre-Trial Judgment, ¶ 177, 179 (Jan. 23,
2012).
159.
For more information on modes of liability at the ICC, see Rome Statute, supra
note 17, art. 25.
160.
Atak & Simeon, supra note 7.
161.
Atak & Simeon, supra note 7; Hall & Ambos, supra note 128, at 167.
162.
Id.
163.
Id. ¶ 389; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101.
164.
Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 389; Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez,
IT-95-14/2, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 94 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 17,
2004); Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 94.
165.
Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 389; Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez,
Appeal Judgment, ¶ 94; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 94.
166.
Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Appeal Judgment, , ¶ 389; Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez,
Appeal Judgment, ¶ 94; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101.
167.
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101 (citing Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 94).
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168

improbability of the acts’ random occurrence. No single factor or absence
thereof is dispositive for either standard, so, for example, the numerosity of
victims alone does not determine whether an attack was widespread or sys169
tematic. Additionally, because the test is disjunctive, a group of factors
may satisfy the test even if they only evince either the widespread or the
170
systematic nature of the attack.
The effect of the totality test is that the scope of admissible cases under
the widespread or systematic requirement is relatively broad—broad enough
to cover peacetime trafficking. Indeed, no ICT has cited conflict or the involvement of force as a factor in the totality test. And because the number
of victims is neither the sole, nor the most important, factor to consider, trafficking committed against relatively few victims could still be judged by the
171
ICC if enough other factors are implicated. For example, it may be possible to demonstrate the systematic nature of trafficking in some countries by
showing the improbability of its random occurrence, as might occur where a
172
trafficker follows a pattern based on a preconceived plan or policy. In
practice, then, the Court’s review of trafficking need not limited only to
large-scale, exploitative enterprises that plague a substantial portion of the
civilian population, or to cases where the government legitimizes a program,
173
such as chattel slavery.
However, although the indicia for a widespread or systematic attack
could facially include peacetime trafficking, caselaw on the widespread or
systematic requirement suggests a trend among ICTs to find that an attack
was widespread or systemic where it occurred in an atmosphere of vio174
lence. Is this trend towards wartime or conflict-ridden cases a product of
168.
Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 389; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal
Judgment, ¶ 94; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101.
169.
Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia v. Herzegovina v. Stupar et al., Appellate Verdict, ¶
376 (Court of Bosnia and Hezegovina, Section for War Crimes Sept. 9, 2009) (“[T]he element
of substantiality does not necessarily refer to the quantitative aspect[.]”). A similar approach is
taken in determining whether an attack amounts to genocide. There is no quantitative minimum for genocide; rather, a substantial part of the national, ethnic, or racial group must be
targeted. See Prosecutor v. Krstić, IT-98-33, Judgment, ¶ 502 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001) (“[T]he definition of genocide] should be read as meaning the destruction of a numerically significant part of the population concerned.”)
170.
Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Further Amended Consolidated Indictment, ¶ 215.
171.
See Atak & Simeon, supra note 7, at 1036; see also Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Appeal
Judgment ¶ 389; Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 94; Prosecutor v.
Blaškić, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 94.
172.
Atak & Simeon, supra note 7, at 1036.
173.
See id.; see also Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 389; Prosecutor v.
Kordić & Čerkez, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 94; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 101;
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 94.
174.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., Pre-Trial Judgment, ¶ 177, 179 (evaluating
whether the alleged murder, deportation, and persecution were committed in the context of a
widespread or systematic attack). Though the Pre-Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Ruto et al.
also considered the scale of the attack and the number of its victims, it primarily reviewed the
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the widespread or systematic requirement itself, or have existing ICT cases
only interpreted it in violent contexts? Because neither the Rome Statute nor
ICT caselaw requires proof of violence as part of the “widespread or systematic” standard, it should not be an obstacle to prosecuting peacetime trafficking in practice.

V. Steps Toward Accountability:
Trafficking Archetypes to Consider
There are three types of peacetime trafficking cases that the OTP should
watch closely for the opportunity to bring before the ICC: (1) state agents
trafficking civilians themselves; (2) state agents facilitating the trafficking
of civilians, but not engaging in the trafficking themselves; and (3) state
agents acquiescing to trafficking, particularly through generationallyembedded forms of slavery. This part will show how each of these three
cases satisfy the threshold elements of article 7—including the requirements
175
of the chapeau. Discussions for each case archetype will conclude with an
overview of the pros and cons of prosecution in practice, with special emphasis on prosecution’s potential to contribute to increased accountability
176
for trafficking.
frequent, repeated acts of violence committed by the accused against the civilian population,
suggesting that the existence of a background of physical violence and destruction formed a
key part of its evaluation.
As another example, in Prosecutor v. Brima et al., the SCSL similarly emphasized the
violent backdrop upon which an alleged abduction, forced labor, and forced marriage were
committed to support its finding of a widespread or systematic attack. Prosecutor v. Brima, et
al., Further Amended Consolidated Indictment. Though it concluded that the forced labor and
marriages did not constitute crimes against humanity, the Trial Chamber emphasized that during the alleged acts, a military coup had occurred and the military had coordinated “routine
direct attacks against civilians suspected of supporting [political opposition], in the course of
which civilians were shot and their property looted,” and entire villages were burned on the
basis that they harbored political opponents. Id. at ¶¶ 224, 227. The Appeals Chamber then
relied on “the atmosphere of violence” in which the forced labor and marriages occurred to
support overturning the Trial Chamber’s finding that these acts did not constitute crimes
against humanity. Prosecutor v. Brima et al., SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 200
(Special Court for Sierra Leone Feb. 22, 2008). Specifically, it noted that victims were repeatedly subjected to physical and sexual violence, forced to watch the killing or mutilation of
close family members, and ostracized from their communities after perpetrators forced them
to become their wives. Id. ¶¶ 199, 200.
And last, the ICTR Appeals Chamber ruled in 2006 that the Trial Chambers must take
judicial notice that a widespread or systematic attack occurred against a civilian population
defined by its Tutsi ethnicity. Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., ICTR-98-44-AR73(C), Decision
on Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice, ¶ 32 (June 16, 2006).
This conclusion was based on multiple killings and commissions of serious bodily or mental
harm against the Tutsi population, resulting in a large number of deaths. Id. ¶ 31.
175.
The first two archetypes lend themselves more to charging as enslavement than as
sexual slavery, but the third archetype could more readily be charged as either.
176.
This section refers to state action, but the ICC could also hear cases involving nonstate organizations with effective control over the relevant territory.
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A. State-Imposed Trafficking: Forced Labor in Prisons
State-imposed forced labor is likely the most straightforward form of
peacetime trafficking to prosecute as a crime against humanity. Defined
broadly as the state taking advantage of an individual’s duty or obligation to
177
the government, state-imposed forced labor includes compulsory participation in public works projects, abused conscription, prison labor, and government-ordered work that exceeds normal civil obligations or contracted
178
services. This section uses the U.S. prison system as an example to
demonstrate that some cases of state-imposed forced labor could satisfy the
179
threshold elements of enslavement under article 7.
The Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution contains a general
ban on slavery, but it makes an exception for labor or services performed as
180
a condition of a prison sentence. Indeed, the practice of prison labor is
now ubiquitous, and the U.S. federal government advertises its prisoners as
181
a cheap source of labor. Through UNICOR (also known as Federal Prison
177.
See Global Estimates of Modern Slavery, supra note 3, at 41–42; Cazzie Reyes,
State-Imposed Forced Labor: Why It Matters, END SLAVERY NOW (Feb. 29, 2016),
https://www.endslaverynow.org/blog/articles/state-imposed-forced-labor-why-it-matters.
178.
Global Estimates of Modern Slavery, supra note 3, at 41; Ruben J. Garcia, U.S.
Prisoners’ Strike Is a Reminder How Common Inmate Labor Is, CBS NEWS (Sept. 3, 2018),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-prisoners-strike-is-reminder-how-commonplace-inmatelabor-is.
179.
The United States is only one illustrative example of how, in general, forced labor
in prisons satisfy the article 7 requirements. As the United States is not a party to the Rome
Statute and because the forced labor it permits occurs in its own territory, the ICC will not be
able to commence an investigation into trafficking violations against U.S. personnel. I have
selected the U.S. example nonetheless because there is relatively more information available
on these crimes and because the logic still applies to States Parties engaging in similar practices. Other States Parties to the Rome Statute employing prison labor include Brazil, see Fabio Teixeira, Volunteers or Slaves? Brazil Accused of Illegal Jail Labor, REUTERS (Apr. 11,
2019, 7:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-slavery/volunteers-or-slavesbrazil-accused-of-illegal-jail-labor-idUSKCN1RN0CN; Canada, see Justin Ling, Prison Labour, NATIONAL (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.nationalmagazine.ca/en-ca/articles/law/indepth/2019/all-work-and-low-pay); Germany, see Jörg Luyken, Prisoners Launch Hunger
Strike Over Forced Labour, LOCAL (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.thelocal.de/20151203/
prisoners-in-forced-labour-go-on-hunger-strike; Hungary, see Pablo Gorondi and Andras
Nagy, Hungarian Inmates Working Around the Clock on Border Fence, AP (Sept. 21, 2016),
https://apnews.com/e2e7543ae87145de95a98a2304fe8286/hungarian-inmates-workingaround-clock-border-fence; and Japan, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, Japanese Prison, (Apr. 17,
2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=5&amp;v=yiw2NULDjKM.
180.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
181.
See generally UNICOR Services Business Group, A Winning Solution to Your
Contact Center Outsourcing Needs, https://www.unicor.gov/publications/services/
CATMS361.pdf (strikingly claiming UNICOR is, “[t]he best kept secret in contact centers”—
a secret which is now “out”—and, “[a] winning solution to your contact center outsourcing
needs” to promote using federal inmates to fill a company’s workforce needs”) (last visited
Apr. 22, 2020). See also Alexia Fernández Campbell, The Federal Government Markets Pris-
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Industries), a government corporation established by executive order, the
U.S. federal government enters into contracts with agencies (such as the
183
U.S. Department of Defense, to construct weapons) and private compa184
nies. Ostensibly, these contracts provide federal inmates with productive
185
work, aiming to promote their rehabilitation into society upon release.
This arrangement, however, gives the federal government control over both
the contractual arrangements with labor purchasers and the prisoners’ sentencing conditions, enabling it to coerce inmates into performing contract
demands or to accept less money in order to keep transaction costs low for
UNICOR’s customers.
U.S. prisoners repeatedly complain of the government abusing their
186
debt to society. For instance, in 2018, inmates in seventeen U.S. states
went on a several week strike to protest maltreatment and slavery-like con187
ditions in prisons, both state and federal. The maltreatment included staff
frequently threatening them—sometimes with violence—if they expressed
188
an unwillingness to work in their prison jobs, while the poor conditions
included low wages—a few dimes for each hour of work, if anything at
all—decrepit living facilities, and no guarantee of safe working condi189
tions. In one federal lawsuit, inmates complained they were exposed to
toxic dust and worked without safety equipment, protective gear, air filtra190
tion, or masks at a UNICOR computer and electronics recycling factory.
In contrast, regulations issued by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration require employers to provide personal protective equipment
wherever employees’ work would expose them to hazards capable of caus191
ing injury or impairment to any part of the body.

on Labor to Businesses as the “Best-Kept Secret”, VOX (Aug. 24, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/2018/8/24/17768438/national-prison-strike-factory-labor.
182.
UNICOR Services Business Group, supra note 181, at 1.
183.
Sara Flounders, The Pentagon and Slave Labor in U.S. Prisons, GLOBAL
RESEARCH (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-pentagon-and-slave-labor-in-us-prisons/25376.
184.
Fernández Campbell, supra note 181.
185.
Id.
186.
Garcia, supra note 178.
187.
Fernández Campbell, supra note 181; Mitch Smith, Prison Strike Organizers Aim
to Improve Conditions and Pay, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/08/26/us/national-prison-strike-2018.html.
188.
Flounders, supra note 183 (stating that, in the U.S. state of Georgia, inmates refused to leave their cells at six prisons for more than a week to protest being forced to work
seven days per week without pay, and that prisoners were beaten if they refused to work).
189.
Fernández Campbell, supra note 181; Smith, supra note 187; Flounders, supra note
183.
190.
Flounders, supra note 183.
191.
U.S. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH STANDARDS STANDARD 1910.132(A) (2016).
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Such exploitative prison labor practices fall squarely within article 7 of
the Rome Statute. The threat of a prolonged sentence or punishment for
non-compliance, officials’ ability to control the prisoner’s movement and
physical environment, and the compulsory labor itself are all factors exhibiting an exercise of power similar to the right of ownership and bringing this
192
offense under the ambit of enslavement.
This offense also meets all of the article 7 chapeau elements for a crime
against humanity. Forced prison labor satisfies article 7’s requirement of an
attack directed against a civilian population. It is an attack because it in193
volves forcing prisoners to repeatedly perform labor. It is directed against
civilians, namely persons serving sentences for violating domestic laws, rather than imprisoned enemy combatants. Finally, forced prison labor is an
official state policy: Prison personnel are a part of a centralized staff hierarchy paid for or monitored by the government, and the government contracts
with potential customers for the prisoners’ labor.
Whether the chapeau’s knowledge requirement is fulfilled depends on
which actors the OTP charges. As this element requires perpetrators to
commit their act or acts with knowledge of the broader campaign against the
civilian population, OTP should target higher-level officials, those analogous to UNICOR personnel with the power to enter into contracts on behalf
of the government, or supervisory officials who have the authority to control
inmates’ workflow, work conditions, and pay scale, or who oversee prisoner
complaints. Charged officials should be those who knew or should have
known about the existence of the repeated, exploitative interactions between
the government and prisoners. Lower-level personnel, such as custodians or
guards with little to no management power, would not have the requisite
knowledge to incur criminal responsibility for trafficking. These personnel
likely would not be aware of the frequent and systematic mistreatment occurring across federal prisons, nor would they have any control over gov194
ernment contracts or prison labor policies.
Finally, forced prison labor can be shown to be widespread or systematic. Prison labor is a commonly used in the United States and other countries
to discipline inmates, and there are frequent complaints of labor abuse in

192.
See supra, text accompanying note 113 for the relevant factors.
193.
Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 7(2)(a).
194.
In cases where the accused cannot be proved to have caused trafficking, individual
international criminal responsibility should not attach, lest the number of defendants be vast.
See Starr, supra note 15, at 1280. OTP should also probably not charge lower-level individuals in an organization who have little to zero influence or policy-making power, and therefore
no control over a criminal policy. In such cases, it is exceedingly difficult to prove that the
accused possessed the requisite mental state––the default requirement in the ICC being
knowledge––for direct commission of one of the codified crimes. See Rome Statute, supra
note 17, art. 30. However, there exist instances where leaders of a state or organization know
that trafficking is occurring and either participate in committing the crime or tacitly acquiesce
to others engaging in it. These cases, which also involve opportunistic use of vulnerable individuals, may be able to come before the ICC. Id.
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195

both public and private U.S. prisons. Thousands of inmates housed in facilities across the country participate in forced labor. It is therefore an attack
of a sufficient scale to be widespread. State-forced prison labor is also part
of an identifiable, non-random pattern of acts against inmates—namely, acts
exploiting sentencing conditions for cheap labor—thereby making the attack
systematic as well.
Nevertheless, while this analysis shows that state-imposed labor could
be prosecuted as a crime against humanity, information-gathering problems
may limit the OTP’s ability to bring these cases. Generally, neither the public nor OTP investigators is able to witness prison conditions or interactions
196
between inmates and staff, and inmates are rarely able to relay their ac197
counts in real time to the public. Grievance systems are not always available to prisoners, and even where they are, corrections departments have lit198
tle incentive to publicize (or respond to) prisoner complaints. ConsequentConsequently, information on the exact prevalence and form of stateimposed forced labor is not always available, posing a challenge to potential
investigations. Where information about prisoner complaints is not easily
obtainable, the ICC may have to engage in more aggressive investigation
practices to prove the widespread or systematic nature of the exploitation.

B. The State as a Trafficking Facilitator:
The Ethiopian-Saudi Kafala System
A state does not have to traffic civilians itself to commit trafficking.
Under the kafala (sponsorship) system in Saudi Arabia and other countries
199
in the Middle East, migrant workers must obtain a kafeel—a sponsor—to
200
receive legal immigration status and work authorization. State-created
processes like these are often abused by workers’ sponsors. State officials
managing these programs may be prosecuted with crimes against humanity
at the ICC if they facilitate and legitimize the sponsors’ exercise of powers
attaching to the right of ownership and if that facilitation satisfies the
threshold requirements of the chapeau.
Consider the kafala program pairing Ethiopian migrant workers with
Saudi citizens as an example. To match Ethiopian migrant workers with the
kafeel that they need secure a visa to legally reside and work in Saudi Ara195.
Garcia, supra note 178; Fernández Campbell, supra note 181; Smith, supra note
187; Flounders, supra note 183.
196.
Smith, supra note 187.
197.
Id.
198.
Id. (quoting a spokeswoman of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation who, in response to being shown a video of an inmate on a hunger strike, declined
to identify the inmate or where the video was recorded).
199.
Int’l Labour Org.: Migrant Forum in Asia, Policy Brief No. 2: Reform of the Kafala
(Sponsorship) System 1, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/docs/132/PB2.pdf (last visited
Apr. 20, 2020) [hereinafter ILO Policy Brief No. 2: Reform of the Kafala System].
200.
Id.
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201

bia, the Saudi government engages with Saudi citizens interested in the
program, while the Ethiopian government drafts employment contracts and
kafala applications for Ethiopian workers and issues them to registered em202
ployment agencies. These agencies recruit Ethiopian domestic workers
203
who sign these contracts and apply for a kafeel. The contracts legally bind
the workers to their prospective employers and make the legality of their
presence in Saudi Arabia dependent on a continued relationship with their
204
employers. In practice, this means that workers must obtain explicit written permission from their sponsors in order to enter the country in the first
place, transfer employment, or leave the country before their contracts
205
end. Saudi employers typically require workers to surrender their pass206
ports and other travel documents, further ensnaring workers.
The Ethiopian and Saudi governments’ pairing of Ethiopian migrant
workers with Saudi employers under the kafala program meets the criteria
207
for enslavement under the Rome Statute. It is not just that the contracts
are abusive. Even protective contract terms contract are exceedingly diffi208
cult to enforce once workers travel overseas. In some cases, the contracts

201.
See Tesfalem Erago, Ethiopians Fear Deportation From Saudi Arabia, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (June 30, 2017), https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopians-fear-deportation-from-saudiarabia/a-39495113; Wesley Dockery & Meriem Marghich, Saudi Arabia: Critics Slam Human Trafficking of Moroccan ‘Maids For Sale’, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.dw.com/en/saudi-arabia-critics-slam-human-trafficking-of-moroccan-maids-forsale/a-42760030; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 2017 REPORT:
COUNTRY NARRATIVES—SAUDI ARABIA (2017), https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/
countries/2017/271271.htm [hereinafter TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 2017 REPORT: COUNTRY
NARRATIVES—SAUDI ARABIA] (“Due to Saudi Arabia’s requirement under its sponsorship,
or kafala, system that foreign workers obtain permission from their employers for an exit visa
to leave the country legally, some are forced to work for months or years beyond their contract term because their employers will not grant them permission for the visa.”).
202.
Ethiopian Women in the Middle East: It’s Contract Slavery, ADDIS STANDARD
(Mar. 1, 2012), https://addisstandard.com/ethiopian-women-in-the-middle-east-its-contractslavery.
203.
Id.; Fassil Demissie, Ethiopian Female Domestic Workers in the Middle East and
Gulf States: An Introduction, 11 AFR. & BLACK DIASPORA: INT’L J. 1 (2018).
204.
Id.
205.
ILO Policy Brief No. 2: Reform of the Kafala System, supra note 199, at 1.
206.
Demissie, supra note 203.
207.
Cf. Zorana Knezevic, The Kafala Labor-Sponsorship System in the Gulf States,
HUMAN TRAFFICKING CENTER (Apr. 24, 2019), https://humantraffickingcenter.org/the-kafalalabor-sponsorship-system-in-the-gulf-states. It may also be possible to bring charges under the
sexual slavery provision where there is evidence that such contracts are being used to coerce
victims into participating in acts of a sexual nature. In Saudi Arabia, however, where the state
strictly controls and showing of sexuality, especially by women, it is unlikely that the kafala
would sponsor sex work. See generally What Are Women Banned from Doing in Saudi Arabia, THE WEEK (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.theweek.co.uk/60339/things-women-cant-do-insaudi-arabia.
208.
Demissie, supra note 203; Nick Webster & Anna Zacharias, UAE Agreement with
Ethiopia Will Further Protect Rights of Domestic Workers, NATIONAL (UAE) (Aug. 14,
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to which workers agree in their home country are not the same as those they
209
work under in the destination country, and the kafeel has the power to revise the employment contract terms after the contract has been accepted.
This gives sponsors the opportunity to force migrant workers to accept lower wages, unfair working conditions, or poorer living situations than originally promised at a time when the workers can no longer leave the coun210
try—or seek a new job—without the sponsor’s permission. This means
that sponsors inclined to invest as little as possible for the services rendered
could do so rather easily, and their employees will feel coerced into accept211
ing new terms. Moreover, as Saudi Arabia lacks robust labor laws and the
will to enforce reasonable kafeel terms, Ethiopian domestic workers often
212
face overwork and abuse.
Examples of state-sponsored forced labor such as the Ethiopian-Saudi
kafala program satisfy a number of the indicia of enslavement expressed in
213
the Kunarac case. The taking of passports amounts to control of movement and prevention of escape. Employers’ free reign to control victims’
environment, and their ability to coerce additional work under the threat of
lower wages or non-renewal of the contract, or by using abuse or false accu214
sations of theft or immigration violations all support a classification of the
215
kafala program as enslavement under the Rome Statute.
State-sponsored forced labor also meets all the chapeau elements of a
crime against humanity under article 7. To start, the kafala program satisfies
article 7’s requirement of an attack directed against a civilian population. It
involves numerous acts of exploitation against thousands of migrant workers, who are civilians looking to earn a livelihood and a crucial source of
216
income outside of their home countries. The attack is also committed pur2018),
https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-agreement-with-ethiopia-will-further-protectrights-of-domestic-workers-1.759812; Knezevic, supra note 207 (explaining that migrant
workers often have difficulties enforcing contracts due to a lack of fluency in Arabic, a lack of
familiarity or understanding of the destination country’s laws, and authorities’ frequent dismissal of workers’ complaints when employer-sponsors, who are citizens, offer a differing
account).
209.
Knezevic, supra note 207.
210.
ILO Policy Brief No. 2: Reform of the Kafala System, supra note 199, at 4;
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 2017 REPORT: COUNTRY NARRATIVES—SAUDI ARABIA, supra
note 201 (“Although many migrant workers sign contracts with their employers, some report
work conditions substantially different from those described in the contract; other workers
never see a work contract at all.”).
211.
Cf. ILO Policy Brief No. 2: Reform of the Kafala System, supra note 199, at 4;
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 2017 REPORT: COUNTRY NARRATIVES—SAUDI ARABIA, supra
note 201.
212.
Demissie, supra note 203.
213.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Appeal Judgment, ¶ 542.
214.
ILO Policy Brief No. 2: Reform of the Kafala System, supra note 199, at 4.
215.
See supra, text accompanying note 113 for the relevant factors.
216.
ILO Policy Brief No. 2: Reform of the Kafala System, supra note 199, at 1; supra
note 132.
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suant to a state policy, since sponsors’ abuses are all realized through the
217
state-sponsored visa-issuing system and contract placement processes.
Whether the kafala system satisfies the article 7 knowledge requirement
again depends on which officials the OTP charges. Many officials in both
destination and departure countries have knowledge that the kafala pro218
gram’s contracts and visas facilitate exploitative practices because they
have ignored complaints of those practices or are aware of colleagues who
219
dismiss them. Thus, ICC trafficking cases would be more viable against
those who oversee immigration or law enforcement policies, or who are responsible for vetting potential employers. However, cases could also be
brought against other personnel playing a key role in the kafala system’s
functioning, like ministers of foreign affairs, because they likely are aware
of the numerous abuses that have occurred—either from worker complaints
or news reports—and have the power to reform the system. It would likely
be difficult to show that individual sponsors or officials who commit abuse
migrant workers have sufficient knowledge of the broader abuses within the
kafala system so as to incur criminal responsibility.
Finally, the abuses in state-sponsored migrant labor programs like the
kafala system are both systematic and widespread. The Saudi and Ethiopian
governments jointly created the visa-issuing system and thus participate in
recruiting individuals for migrant work. Hundreds of thousands of domestic
workers apply for a kafala, and thousands of victims complain of abuse of
labor or living conditions resulting from their kafeel’s control over the con220
tract and visa. These abuses are so consistent as to constitute an identifiable pattern of crimes, all linked to the weak protections provided to these
workers, and therefore extend beyond the random actions of individual
sponsors.
However, because Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia recently entered into an
221
agreement to bolster protection for kafala workers, the OTP should carefully weigh whether to bring a case against officials from either state. States
should not be deterred from curbing their facilitation of trafficking or faulted for making sincere but incomplete efforts to enhance protections from
trafficking, even if they do not completely mitigate the problem. In such
cases, a more fact-intensive investigation will be required to determine if
states sincerely intend to meet their obligations under the Rome Statute to
hold individuals responsible for trafficking accountable.

217.
See supra note 142.
218.
See ILO Policy Brief No. 2: Reform of the Kafala System, supra note 199, at 2
(“Sending countries and recruiters contribute to the Kafala system by providing the workers
despite the well-documents reports of abuse and exploitation of migrant workers.”).
219.
Id. at 4.
220.
Demissie, supra note 203.
221.
Webster & Zacharias, supra note 208; President Sheikh Khalifa Issues Labour Law
to Support Service Workers, NATIONAL (UAE) (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.thenational.ae/
uae/president-sheikh-khalifa-issues-labour-law-to-support-service-workers-1.661763.
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C. The State as an Acquiescent: Chattel Slavery in Mauritania
As discussed in the previous section, a state or organizational official
does not always have to act to incur international criminal responsibility for
trafficking. In fact, the state does not even have to be a direct facilitator of
trafficking, as it is when it knowingly issues visas to migrant workers who
are then exploited. A more ambitious—but still plausible—route for prosecution of trafficking is for the ICC to investigate and prosecute heads of
state in countries with pervasive, generationally-embedded forms of slav222
ery.
Caste systems can legitimize both labor and sex trafficking and justify
them on the basis of class. While a government may not affirmatively promote the trafficking that its society’s caste systems produce, there is room
for the ICC to act where a government refuses to provide protections for
victims or to implement laws to combat this crime. Some state actions or
omissions, such as the Mauritanian government’s complicity in White
Moors’ enslavement of the Haratine ethnic group, may be prosecuted as
crimes against humanity where the actions or omissions aid and abet some
individuals’ exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership.
In Mauritania, people of the Haratine ethnic group—historically en223
slaved by White Moors—are born into slavery and owned by masters. As
a result of this practice, an estimated twenty percent of the Mauritanian
224
population (about 600,000 people ) is forced into a lifetime of labor ex225
226
ploitation and torture. Many slaves are physically brutalized, and female

222.
Inaction in the face of the attack may be an actus reus for human trafficking where
the accused was found to have a duty to act to protect a population. See, e.g., Prosecutor v.
Ntagerura et al., ICTR-99-46-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 334–35 (July 7, 2006); Prosecutor v.
Galić, IT-98-29-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 663 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 30
Nov. 2006) (citing Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Appeal Judgment); Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1,
Appeal Judgment, ¶ 188 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999). Normatively, such omissions are worthy of punishment to deter similar actions, since where a state
refuses or fails to investigate or prosecute a crime against humanity, it accepts the crime and
tacitly encourages similar, dangerous acts in the future. TERJE EINARSEN & JOSEPH RIKHOF,
A THEORY OF PUNISHABLE PARTICIPATION IN UNIVERSAL CRIMES 359 (2018). This view has
had little traction—likely because of issues in determining how far this duty should stretch.
Nonetheless, it remains possible for an individual to be liable on the basis that he had responsibility to act to prevent past and future abuses.
223.
Mauritania: Descent-Based Slavery, ANTI-SLAVERY (last visited Apr. 20, 2020),
https://www.antislavery.org/what-we-do/mauritania; The Unspeakable Truth About Slavery in
Mauritania, GUARDIAN (June 8, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/
2018/jun/08/the-unspeakable-truth-about-slavery-in-mauritania.
224.
Haratin, UNREPRESENTED NATIONS & PEOPLES ORG. (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://unpo.org/members/13228.
225.
The Unspeakable Truth About Slavery in Mauritania, supra note 223.
226.
Mauritania: Descent-Based Slavery, supra note 223; The Unspeakable Truth About
Slavery in Mauritania, supra note 223 (reporting instances including a slave master pouring
hot embers over a victim’s baby, killing it, and another slave master tying a victim’s hands to
a tent pole, cutting off one of her fingers).
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slaves are often raped by their masters and forced to bear their children, who
227
are also slaves. Even if a slave manages to escape, he is branded as part of
228
the “slave-caste” and is ostracized from the rest of society.
Although Mauritania has criminalized slavery since 2007, the govern229
ment rarely enforces the law, and slavery remains rampant. Since 2007,
Mauritanian anti-slavery courts have convicted and sentenced only four
230
slave masters. This conviction rate is highly disproportionate to the number of complaints: In 2016 alone, anti-slavery courts received forty-seven
231
cases for investigation involving fifty-three suspects. Rather than prosecuting slave masters, the government has denied that slavery still exists in
232
233
the country, and it has imprisoned anti-slavery activists. These individual complaints, group protests, and even international reporting have repeatedly notified government officials of the continuance of slavery, yet the
government has chosen to turn a blind eye instead of taking action.
It is not surprising that Haratine slavery falls under the scope of enslavement—with Moorish owners tautologically having the power of ownership over those they’ve enslaved—and, where sex is involved, sexual
slavery. Slaves must perform domestic work, including looking after live234
stock, preparing meals, or fetching water for no remuneration. In cases of
sexual slavery, victims—often women—are subjected to sexual abuse for
the gratification of their masters and even for family members or friends of
235
their masters. Moreover, slave owners control their victims’ physical environment, movement, and as explained above, often use force if the slave

227.
Sebastian Bouknight & Timothy Hucks, Slavery Hidden in Plain Sight in Mauritania, INSIDE ARABIA (Jan. 30, 2019), https://insidearabia.com/slavery-hidden-plain-sightmauritania; Mauritania: Descent-Based Slavery, supra note 223.
228.
The Unspeakable Truth About Slavery in Mauritania, supra note 223.
229.
Bouknight & Hucks, supra note 227; Haratin, UNREPRESENTED NATIONS &
PEOPLES ORG. (Apr. 10, 2017), https://unpo.org/members/13228. Mauritania also ratified the
Trafficking Protocol in 2005, and therefore it is under a duty to investigate, prosecute, and
prevent trafficking offenses from occurring on its territory. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 4.
230.
Bouknight & Hucks, supra note 227.
231.
Id.
232.
Id. (quoting Mauritania’s Minister of Rural Development, who stated, “I must tell
you that in Mauritania, there is total freedom. . . . Slavery has been abolished. So there is absolutely no more problem of that.”).
233.
Anti-Slavery Press Release, Mauritania: ‘Devastating Blow’ as Activists Jailed,
ANTI-SLAVERY (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.antislavery.org/mauritania-activists-sentenced;
John Campbell, The State of Slavery in Mauritania, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Oct.
14, 2016), https://www.cfr.org/blog/state-slavery-mauritania (“A Mauritanian blogger, who
had written posts criticizing the country’s caste system, remains on death row after his 2014
conviction for blasphemy.”).
234.
The Unspeakable Truth About Slavery in Mauritania, supra note 223.
235.
Johanna Higgs, Surviving Violence In The Sahara: The Women of Mauritania,
HUFF. POST (Feb. 17, 2017, 10:17 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/johannahiggs/surviving-violence-in-the_b_14807932.html.
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236

does not comply. In one account, a Haratine woman explained that two of
her babies died because her masters forced her to work instead of taking
237
care of her children.
The Mauritanian government’s complicity in the White Moors’ enslavement of the Haratine ethnic group meets all of the article 7 chapeau elements of a crime against humanity under article 7. First, it satisfies the
chapeau’s requirement of an attack directed against a civilian population.
Haratine enslavement is an attack against civilians. It entails the commission of a vast number of offenses against civilian slave-caste members:
Hundreds of thousands of Haratine individuals are exploited by members of
238
the White Moor caste. This attack is also committed pursuant to state policy, because the Mauritanian government’s choice not to enforce its own anti-slavery law amounts to a tacit policy of acquiescence to and approval of
continuing slavery. Focus should be on what the government has or has not
239
done to protect the lower classes from enslavement. Where the government has done nothing to functionally end, or has in fact promoted, the caste
system, evidence of a state policy to preserve the caste system is more obvious. Where the government has implemented laws against slavery or protections for the exploited instead, then a more fact-intensive inquiry into the
extent to which the government has responded to victim complaints and
whether continuing abuses are actually a result of one-off, unlinked instances may be necessary.
As for the knowledge requirement, it is inconceivable that individuals
in the government—or any other individuals in Mauritania, for that matter—are not aware of the Mauritanian caste system, because it is an integral
part of Mauritanian society and affects every citizen’s life. An ICC case
against an acquiescent state like Mauritania would be most viable against
higher-level officials responsible for enforcing laws outlawing slavery or
punishing perpetrators of caste-system abuses. To make a case against these
individuals, OTP would need to prove that they had knowledge not only of
the caste system but also of the way the caste system creates a broad system
of abuses against the slave caste, either through actual complaints re240
ceived —whether formal or not—or from reports, protests, or personal
241
witness. Individual slave owners, in contrast, may not have the same level
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of awareness of the way the caste system perpetuates broader harms against
the slave caste.
Finally, the White Moors’ enslavement of the Haratine ethnic group is
widespread and systematic. The caste system is of a sufficient scale and
harms enough victims to qualify as a widespread attack, because it pervades
everyday life with virtually complete communal participation. It also
amounts to a systematic attack, because it methodically subjects particular
groups to abusive treatment based on their birth. This pattern of crimes is
identifiable and not random: The system repeatedly abuses those born into
the lowest caste level and forces them to engage in labor or sexual acts
against their will. And, arguably, because Mauritanian officials and authorities—particularly those in policymaking capacities—participate in the crime
by either denying its existence or refusing to respond to complaints of
abuse, they contribute to the widespread nature of the crime by preserving
and perpetuating the system throughout country.
Nonetheless, there may be some hurdles to charging a trafficking offense on the basis of caste-base enslavement. One may be gathering evidence. Victims’ complaints and reports would need to be recorded, perhaps
with the help of local advocates or an organization dedicated to assisting
victims. Showing proof that an officer or other relevant official repeatedly
or systematically declined to investigate allegations of slavery would require victims to come forward about their cases—a challenge, as victims
may fear that reporting will lead to negative consequences in a society already prejudiced against them and highly dependent on their continuing labor.
Investigators must also determine when a government’s efforts are in
good faith or reflect apathy. Where a government has implemented
measures to combat caste-based trafficking abuses, but it does not actually
enforce them, state policy permits the subjugation of lower social classes to
abusive treatment against their will. The OTP could begin by only investigating cases of multigenerational government acquiescence to trafficking,
where there is demonstrated, long-term government inaction in the face of
complaints. In any case, OTP must exercise prudence so as to neither
wrongly accuse a government of apathy, nor to wrongly expend the Court’s
limited resources.

VI. Conclusion
Though the ICC has never issued a decision on trafficking, the Rome
Statute contemplates the ICC’s jurisdiction over trafficking as an actus reus
of crimes against humanity. Upon examining how the Rome Statute codifies
trafficking and how ICTs have understood similar provisions in the past, it
is clear that there are no legal barriers to prosecuting trafficking, even in
times of relative peace. Though the ICC’s OTP may face challenges in determining how best to classify any given instance of trafficking—whether as
enslavement or as sexual slavery—or in establishing that the trafficking in
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question was sufficiently extensive to satisfy article 7’s “widespread or systematic attack” requirement, the Court has the potential to play a greater
role in the international efforts to combat this crime, complementing state
action under the Trafficking Protocol. In particular, the Court has the capacity to try certain kinds of systemic, peacetime trafficking cases: Namely,
when states engage in, facilitate, or acquiesce to trafficking.
This note has given only illustrative examples of these three kinds of
prosecutable peacetime trafficking, leaving open the question of who exactly to indict and how to deal with the evidentiary challenges that investigating these cases may present. While, ideally, the state or organizational officer whose responsibilities are most intertwined with trafficking should be
held accountable for it, any indictment and investigation will likely face
fierce opposition from the officer’s supporters in his home state or even internationally. The prosecution of peacetime trafficking will require discussions about how to balance the countervailing considerations of ending impunity and preserving the legitimacy of the Court. While big questions of
what will happen in practice remain open, only with trial and error—rather
than inaction—can progress be made.

